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FOREWORD 
Many of  t o d a y ' s  most s i g n i f i c a n t  socioeconomic  problems,  
such a s  s l o w e r  economic growth,  t h e  d e c l i n e  of  some e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n d u s t r i e s ,  and s h i f t s  i n  p a t t e r n s  of f o r e i g n  t r a d e ,  a r e  i n t e r -  
o r  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  i n  n a t u r e .  I n t e r c o u n t r y  compara t ive  a n a l y s e s  
o f  r e c e n t  h i s t o r i c a l  developments  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  when w e  a t t e m p t  
t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  p r o c e s s e s  o f  economic s t r u c t u r a l  
change and f o r m u l a t e  u s e f u l  h y p o t h e s e s  c o n c e r n i n g  f u t u r e  de- 
ve lopments .  The u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e s e  p r o c e s s e s  and f u t u r e  
p r o s p e c t s  p r o v i d e s  t h e  f o c u s  f o r  IIASA's p r o j e c t  on Comparat ive 
A n a l y s i s  of  Economic S t r u c t u r e  and Growth. 
To u n d e r s t a n d  t h e s e  economic p r o c e s s e s  c o m p l e t e l y  however, 
an  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  r o l e  p l a y e d  by dynamic p r o c e s s e s  of  
l o n g  d u r a t i o n  i s  a l s o  needed. I n  many economic i s s u e s  it i s  
i m p e r a t i v e  t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h e  p a r t s  p l a y e d  by s t r u c t u r a l  and 
c y c l i c a l  c a u s e s .  Such e v e n t s  a r e  s t u d i e d  i n  s o - c a l l e d  long- 
waves t h e o r i e s  which f o r  a l m o s t  a c e n t u r y  have  f a s c i n a t e d  n o t  
o n l y  e c o n o m i s t s .  To d a t e  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  long-waves t h e o r i e s  
t h a t  t r y  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e s e  c a u s e s  w i t h  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s  o f  s u c c e s s .  
However, t h e  spec t rum of  views on t h e  long-wave phenomenon i s  
v e r y  wide,  i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  who q u e s t i o n  t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e  a l l -  
t o g e t h e r .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  consensus  seems t o  be  t h a t  t h e  
long-wave phenomenon may h e l p  i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  complex economic 
p r o c e s s e s .  
T h i s  s t u d y  by C.W.A.M. van P a r i d o n  i s  a n  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  
t h e  numerous and v a r i o u s  i n t r 2 c a t e  p r o c e s s e s  one h a s  t o  con- 
s i d e r  when t r y i n g  t o  e x p l a i n  long-wave behav2or .  T h i s  work was 
i n  p a r t  p r e p a r e d  d u r i n g  t h e  a u t h o r ' s  s t a y  a t  IIASA a s  a winner  
o f  t h e  P e c c e i  F e l l o w s h i p  Award and draws on h i s  p r e v i o u s  work on 
s t r u c t u r a l  change and f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  
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EZONOMIC GROWTH AND SLXUCTURAL CHANGE: 
A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION OF T m  LONG WAVE 
C. W.A.M. van P a t i d o n  
1. INTRODUCTION 
1984 became a yea r  in which important questions were posed, and not only be- 
cause of the Orwellian context. In economics heavy discussion arose as to whether 
1984 w a s  t he  f i r s t  yea r  of a new, long wave upswing o r  just another  y e a r  in t h e  
more prosperous phase of t h e  normal business cycle in a still continuing, long wave 
downward movement. The problem w a s  clearly expressed in t h e  opening sentence 
of t he  Economic Outlook of t he  OECD (July 1984): 'With t he  OECD economy, and 
mosr, economies individually, now well into recovery,  crucial  questions are how 
strong,  and how durable,  t he  recovery will prove t o  be" (OECD, 1984, p. 15). How 
pregnant these questions were became clear when the  OECD projections f o r  t he  
next year  were taken into account. Real GNP f o r  the  OECD area rose from 2.4% in 
1983 to 4.5% in 1984, but f o r  1985 a slowdown w a s  expected to 2.7%. Two o the r  im- 
portant  variables, the  rate of inflation and the  unemployment r a t e ,  showed only a 
very  slight improvement in th i s  projection. 
It  cannot be  said t ha t  economic scientists and economic policymakers have 
t rea ted  the cur ren t  economic depression in t he  m o s t  optimal way. Too often, a 
r a t h e r  short-term view has  been held and short-term solutions proposed, while i t  
became more and more clear t ha t  long-term developments had to be  analyzed, and 
also t ha t  only in the  longer term could a r ea l  improvement of t h e  economic situa- 
tion be  expected. The question ar ises:  "Why w a s  t he re  this  short-sightedness?" 
Two reasons can be  given. On the  one hand, political decision-making has  been 
nearly always directed at short-term resul ts  because of e lectoral  motives. Politi- 
cians want to see immediate resul ts  of t he i r  policy proposals and are less demand- 
ing f o r  longer term improvements. This short-term atti tude in t h e  economic area 
w a s  especially strengthened in t he  post World War I1 period, because of t he  intro- 
duction of mostly Keynesian inspired models, very  usable f o r  short-term forecasts .  
And since most of the  time these forecasts  have been confirmed by reali ty,  i t  i s  not 
s o  s t range  that  this att i tude prevailed. 
However, and this is  t he  o the r  side of t he  s tory ,  economists have not given 
sufficient warning of t he  possible danger  or, even worse, they have not themselves 
realized well-enough the  possibility t ha t  at some moment these models would fail. 
Each model w a s  constructed on the  assumption tha t  the  basic, underlying s t ruc tu re  
of a n  economy would not change in t he  sho r t  term. By the  basic, underlying s t ruc-  
t u r e  I mean: 
(1) The s t ruc ture  of consumption and production. 
(2) A constancy in t he  behavior of all  t he  re levant  actors in t he  economic 
process - consumers, producers ,  investors - on the  various markets. 
A s  long as this basic economic s t ruc tu re  did not change, t h e  models predicted very 
well. However, in t he  longer t e r m ,  (1) gradually changed and, as soon as the  stag- 
nation s tar ted,  (2) changed drastically. Immediately, t he  models were no longer 
able t o  trace the  economic developments in a reasonable way. 
The neglect of this change in the basic s t ruc ture  of t he  economy also oc- 
cur red  with r ega rd  t o  t h e  theory of economic growth, another  main branch of 
research  in the  1960s t ha t  was directed at an explanation of long-term develop- 
ments. The mistake not to account for  changes in the  basic s t ruc tu re  of the  econo- 
my w a s  a major determinant in the  theory's failure at t he  end of t he  1970s. 
Although economic science has lost much of i ts  s ta tus  in r ecen t  years ,  i t  must 
be said in favor  of i t  t ha t  some changes did occur in i t s  r e sea rch  program as soon 
as i t  became clear t ha t  t h e  old approaches failed to fully account f o r  the  changed 
circumstances. One of t h e  most promising new approaches has  been tha t  of long 
wave research .  
Since 1975, renewed attention has been paid to t ha t  old, nearly forgotten, and 
sometimes ridiculed aspec t  of economic science. Culminating in Schumpeter's 
Business Cycles, r e sea rch  on long waves had been very important in t h e  1930s. 
Van Gelderen, d e  Wolff, Kondratieff, and Schumpeter, among o thers ,  had t r ied to 
prove the  existence of such a long wave and to describe a possible theoretical ex- 
planation of it.  After World War 11, long wave theory w a s  dropped from sight. The 
f i r s t  signs, however, of a new economic cr is is  revived interest .  Since then, a re- 
markable growth has  appeared  in this a r e a ;  witness t h e  sti l l  increasing stream of 
publications and conferences on this subject.' Without any doubt, research  has  
deepened ou r  insights into t h e  causes of the  present  economic depression and, 
more generally, into t h e  longer term development of industrialized economies. But 
i t  is also clear t ha t  a theory  with t he  definitive answer is  st i l l  lacking. In this 
working paper  I propose some, in my view, indispensable, materials fo r  such a 
theory. 
Par t ly  based on some of my ear l ie r  publications, published in ~ u t c h , '  and 
partly based on ongoing r e sea rch  fo r  my doctoral thesis. I p resen t  h e r e  a possible 
explanation of t h e  phenomenon of the  long wave. In this  outline developments in 
and between (a) economic growth, (b) transformation of t h e  economic s t ruc ture ,  
and (c) international economic relationships, a r e  important elements. 
To make my position in t h e  a r e a  of long waves a bit  more clear, I start with a 
brief survey on r ecen t  developments in long wave r e sea rch .  Thereaf ter ,  I 
describe my view of long wave economic development. Finally, I r e tu rn  to t he  
problems raised in t he  Introduction as to t he  position t h e  industrialized countries 
find themselves with r ega rd  t o  the  long wave a t  this moment. On the  basis of t he  
presented outline, I try to give some preliminary answers. In this  respec t ,  I also 
broaden t h e  discussion by presenting some thoughts on t h e  economic and social 
consequences of some possible choices with regard  t o  a (desired) fu ture  economic 
development. 
2. Research on Long Waves: An Overview 
Normally, to present  a survey of a particular r e sea rch  a r e a  is  one of t he  
more difficult tasks.  All t h e  different opinions have to be  taken into account and 
valued. Even more difficult is  to survey an a r e a  in which t h e  opinions are not yet  
fully crystallized and in which new opinions are still appearing at t e time of writ- 5 ing. However, f o r  t h e  case of long wave research ,  severa l  au thors  have recently 
compieted this  task in a way tha t  is  difficult t o  improve upon. I have decided to use 
one of these s u r  eys,  namely the  most recent  by Delbeke (1984), as a framework 
fo r  this section.' Delbeke classifies long wave research  in t h r e e  different ways; 
f i r s t ,  on t h e  basis of a n  inductive or a deductive approach;  second, on t he  basis of 
t he  main explanatory determinant; and, third,  on t he  methodology chosen. 
A s  in the  normal p rocess  of sc ience,  f i r s t  t h e  more inductive phase  had t o  oc- 
cur. Research in th is  phase  was di rec ted  at identifying par t i cu la r  long wave 
developments in severa l  kinds of var iables ,  r e a l  as well as monetary, and at t ry ing 
to prove  t h e  (non)existence of th is  kind of wave. I t  cannot b e  said t h a t  th is  kind of 
r e s e a r c h  has y e t  achieved clear-cut answers.  The conclusions have ranged from 
full acceptance of a wave with a fixed regu la r i ty  to outr ight  re ject ion of any 
wave-like concept  at al l ,  especially f o r  r e a l  var iables  such as industrial  output  o r  
GNP. Severa l  r easons  can be  given f o r  t h e  exis tence of th i s  confusing situation. 
F i r s t ,  s e v e r a l  v e r y  di f ferent  methods - descr ipt ive ,  historiographic,  empirico- 
inductive - were used in t h e  formulation of tenta t ive  hypotheses and assumptions, 
tenta t ive  because  no firm body of deductive r e s e a r c h  was yet  available. Second, a 
necessa ry  requirement f o r  any inductive r e s e a r c h  could not b e  met sufficiently, 
namely t h e  availability of qualitative, a c c u r a t e  d a t a  on a sufficient  number of 
economic and noneconomic var iables  o v e r  a sufficiently long period.  And th i rd ,  
and  cer ta inly  not  t h e  l eas t  important, scepticism about  t h e  long wave concept  also 
arose because of s e v e r e  criticism of t h e  applied stat ist ical  procedures .  In s p i t e  of 
a l l  these  correct reservat ions ,  and of a l l  t h e  di f ferences  of opinion on t h e  ex- 
i s tence of long waves, I am inclined to s u p p o r t  t h e  view t h a t  t h e  industrialized 
economies have shown, a f t e r  t h e i r  r espec t ive  take-off phases ,  a wave-like 
development i 3  t h e i r  r e a l  and monetary var iables ,  with a duration of between 40 
and  60  years .  Specific circumstances and developments, d i f ferent  in different  
per iods ,  strongly influence t h e  length of e a c h  wave, especially in t h e  downward 
phase .  
The absolute answer as to t h e  exis tence of long waves cannot b e  given in t h e  
v e r y  n e a r  fu tu re ,  since,  f o r  instance,  time-series o v e r  a sufficiently long per iod 
are s t i l l  scarce. Also, since waiting f o r  a n o t h e r  100  y e a r s  cannot b e  s e e n  as a rea- 
sonable  option, r ecen t ly  most r e s e a r c h  on long waves has  been d i rec ted  at a n  ex- 
planation of t h e  long wave and at t h e  underlying causal  mechanisms. Delbeke 
(1984) use  two kind of classifications in analyzing t h e  severa l  more deductive ap- 
proaches.' One classification i s  based upon t h e  main explanatory determinant,  t h e  
o t h e r  on t h e  methodology chosen. With r e s p e c t  to t h e  f i r s t  kind of classification, 
Delbeke distinguished between r e a l ,  monetary, and  institutional theor ies ,  of which 
t h e  r e a l  theor ies  have a t t r a c t e d  most a t tent ion recent ly .  In con t ras t  with t h e  ear- 
l i e r  per iods  of flourishing long wave r e s e a r c h ,  monetary theor ies  are now pushed 
to t h e  background. One of t h e  main reasons  f o r  th is  decline in t h e  importance of 
monetary theor ies  i s  t h a t ,  a f t e r  World War I1 p r i c e s  have only increased and have 
no t  declined, as would b e  expected from his tor ical  pa t t e rns .  Institutional theor ies  
have  increased in re la t ive  importance. 
In t h e  severa l  t ea l  theories,  Delbeke saw a common basic p a t t e r n ,  namely t h a t  
t h e  a u t h o r s  t r i e d  t o  explain t h e  a l ternat ion of per iods  of shor tage  and abundance 
of a production f a c t o r  o r  input. As production f a c t o r s  or inputs, h e  l isted,  ac- 
cord '  g to t h e  di f ferent  theor ies ,  capi ta l ,  l abor ,  raw materials, and en t repreneur -  \PL 
ship .  A t  t h e  lower turning point t h e  re levan t  production f a c t o r  shows a n  abundant 
supply with a relat ively l o w  pr ice .  During t h e  upswing it becomes s c a r c e r ,  resul-  
t a n t  with r ising p r ices ,  in th i s  way contributing to t h e  lowering of profi tabil i ty of 
t h e  production process .  Another f a c t o r  f o r  t h e  decline in prof i ts  is t h e  lack of a 
suff ic ient  income redistr ibution,  hindered as i t  i s  by social  and institutional iner-  
t ia .  Only a f t e r  a par t i cu la r  per iod when t h e s e  ine r t i a  are removed and income 
redis t r ibut ion has  succeeded, does t h e  s c a r c i t y  of t h e  f a c t o r  decline and i t s  rela- 
t ive  p r i c e  decrease .  
The second group  of theor ies ,  t h e  monetary  o t ien ted ,  has  shown a decline in 
importance,  although most a u t h o r s  on  long wave theor ies  would a g r e e  with t h e  
s ta tement  t h a t  p r i c e  formation, in te res t  r a t e s ,  c red i t ,  and money circulation are 
essent ia l  elements. Delbeke states t h a t  these  elements are neglected too  much in 
r ecen t  theories. 8 
The same remark does not apply t o  the  third group, tha t  of social and  i n s t i -  
tu t ional  theories. The authors  of these theories consider a pure  economic 
analysis as too narrow, and propose a n  approach in which the  whole system and the 
interactions between social, institutional, technological, and economic subsystems 
are  take^ into account. Also, research  on market behavior falls into this 
category. 
Delbeke concluded tha t  although the  several  theories emphasized different 
aspec ts  of the  long wave movement and although they had different starting points 
and assumptions, they were more complementary than is normally suggested. Ac- 
cording to him, a fruitful approach t o  t he  phenomenon of the long wave is not pos- 
sible if all  the  t h r e e  main branches of theories,  rea l ,  monetary, and institutional, 
are not integrated. He therefore  prefer red ,  along with Van Duijn and o the r  au- 
thors ,  a n  eclectic approach. because such a complex p nomenon as t he  long wave 
could not be  reasonably explained in a monocausal way. Ps 
The second classification is based on several  methodologies developed to 
analyze long waves. Delbeke distinguished between the historical-institutional ap- 
proach. t he  growth theoretical approach,  the  macroeconomic approach, and the  
analysis of noneconomic variables. 
In t he  h i s t o r i c a l i h s t i t u t i o n a l  approach, each wave is seen as a unique 
event.  Any deterministic interpretation of history is re jected.  These authors  
stress t h e  point tha t  the  start of an  upward phase of a long wave is dependent on 
t h e  rapid diffusion of a new, important technology - microelectronics and the  re- 
lated communication-oriented technologies in 1985, f o r  instance. This diffusion. 
however, i s  initially hindered by the  lack of accompanying institutional innova- 
tions, on both a national and international level. Each wave i s  then characterized 
by a part icular  match of technological and of social and institutional innovations. 
Once in t he  upward phase, t h e  possibilities of the new technology are explored t o  
t h e  end (along a technoeconomic paradigm). Coming close t o  exhaustion, t h e  growth 
process  slows down, passing into the  downward phase. A new group of technologies 
has  t o  emerge, involving not only technical innovations, but also new managerial 
and organizational pripfiples, to change the  economic development once again in 
t h e  positive direction. On the  whole the  analysis of this approach is r a t h e r  ver- 
bal. Authors like Freeman and Perez-Perez show in the i r  way of analysis a certain 
resemblance to Schurnpeter, stressing the  need of a qualitative dimension in the  
long wave debate. 
Conversely, t he  o the r  approaches have a much s t ronger  
mathematical/statistical background. In the  growth-theoretical approach, non- 
l inear  dynamic models are used to study the  emergence of new configurations from 
s t ruc tura l  instability. Mensch, taken as the  most important representat ive of this 
group, uses a metamorphosis model of long-term industrial innovation, showing tha t  
four  phases can be discerned by the  mix of innovation types, basic/improvement, 
and product/process. Inventions are assumed to be made randomly over  time. 
Transformation into a basic innovation takes time and i s  strongly dependent on the  
s t a t e  of the  economy, i.e., t he  old technologies must approach the i r  level of sa- 
turation. If the conditions a r e  favorable,  then many of the  accumulated inventions 
may be  turned into pract ical  applications within a relatively sho r t  period of time. 
Above a certain threshold level, they push the  economy in an  upward movement. 
Reaching tha t  threshold level gives, normally, a situation of heavy competition 
between the  new technologies, filtering out t he  s t ronger  ones, which then become 
t h e  new leading sec tors  Once these sectors approach the i r  saturation level, the  
downward phase begins. 12 
In the  macroeconomic approach,  the systems dynamics methodology of 
Forres te r  and his MIT group deserves a detailed description. Their goal is t o  
develop a theory with an  endogenous s t ruc tura l  explanation of t he  long wave. To 
avoid problems with collecting sufficient data  of good quality, they constructed the  
so-called System Dynamic National Model (SDNM), based on four  mechanisms; name- 
ly, self-ordering of capital goods, debt  pr ice  dynamics, technology and innovation, 
and political and social values. Of these mechanisms the  self-ordering of capital 
goods, using bootstraps and lags, is seen as t he  basic one, generating a long wave 
of i t s  own, while t he  o the r  t h ree  mechanisms simply amplify t h a t  wave. These 
mechanisms are constructed on the  basis of the  behavior of microeconomic agents, 
with limited information and bounded rationality in the  process of decision making. 
With this  model they show how rational, microeconomic behavior can c rea t e  i r ra -  
tional consequences on the  macrolevel. The validity of the i r  approach is shown by 
con onting the resul ts  generated by this  model with actual da ta  f o r  t he  US econo- 
my. 15 
The fourth and last approach. on the  importance of noneconomic var iab les  in 
explaining the long wave, is probably the  best example of interdisciplinary 
r e sea rch  in this field. Most authors stress the  role  of these variables in the long 
wave, but i t  has been r a t h e r  difficult s o  far to integrate them into the several  
theories  and models in a prope r  way. Several  promising attempts t o  overcome this 
obstacle have been made in recent  times. Some have analyzed the  relationships 
between long waves and social variables - phases of class struggle,  sociopsycho- 
logical variables. and measures of motivation. Other authors,  and in this  respect  
t he  work of Perez-Perez deserves special attention, have described a theoretical 
explanation of the  long wave, in which the  upward phase shows a positive interac- 
tion between the  technoeconomic and the  socioinstitutional systems. In t h e  down- 
ward phase, the changing technoeconomic system shows major frictions with an as 
ye t  unchanged socioinstitutional environment. Only when this  last  system has 
changed too, through the  appropriate  social and institutional innovations, can a 
new upswing be unleashed. 
3. Some Debatable  h e s  
After this r a t h e r  sho r t  overview on long waves, 1 now discuss t he  following is- 
sues  in g rea t e r  detail: 
(1) The concept of innovations. 
(2) The role  of investment. 
(3) The process  of s t ruc tura l  change. 
(4) The methodology in t he  deductive approach.  
In explaining t h e  occurrence of long waves, the concept of i n n o v a t i o n  is  the  
most prominent. Firmly based on Schumpeterian insights, authors  such as Mensch, 
Freeman, and Van Duijn have recently developed this  concept fur ther ;  however, 
each  with different accents. Mensch s t ressed  the  endogenous cha rac t e r  of the  
process ,  showing tha t  basic innovations have to appea r  in clusters  before a new 
upward phase starts, and tha t  innovations differ  in cha rac t e r  along the  long wave. 
Freeman emphasized the  diffusion aspect  of innovation, creating new possibilities 
in many sec tors  o the r  than the  one in which the  innovation originated. Van Duijn 
connected the concept of innovation with tha t  of the  product life cycle, in this way 
introducing the element of leading sec tors .  Innovations are, according to Van 
Duijn's opinion, a necessary but not a sufficient condition f o r  t he  start of a new 
upswing. Therefore,  infrastructural  investment on a l a rge  scale i s  also necessary. 
With the concept of innovations, i t  is  made c lear  that  technological knowledge, 
in the broadest sense, does not grow at a constant r a t e ,  and tha t  it is  a costly pro- 
cess, in both time and money. This vision contrasts  strongly with ideas used in most 
of the  neoclassical growth models. 
There a r e ,  however, also some problems with the concept of innovation. First ,  
t h e r e  a r e  some methodological problems with respect  to both the  exact  definition 
and classification of innovations and the  exact  dating of innovations. Even in more 
recent  analyses the meaning of innovation is mostly curtailed to product and pro- 
cess  innovations, at t he  expense of o the r  features  such as the  opening of new 
markets and the introduction of new organizational structures.  
The main problem, however, is whether innovations can really generate  long 
waves. For res te r  and his group, and also Mandel, have the i r  doubts about this. 
One of the  most crit ical reviews in this respect  w a s  published recently by Rosen- 
berg  and Frischtak (1984). They state tha t  the  theory does not fulfill t he  neces- 
s a ry  requirements with respect to causality, timing, economy-wide repercussions, 
and recur rence .  They conclude tha t  t he  concept of innovation as t he  explanation 
of the long wave could not yet be validated. I support the main lines of this  ar t ic le ,  
s t ressing especially the  elements of causality and timing. I t  has not been made 
c l ea r ,  in my opinion, why an upward phase starts at a certain moment and which 
conditions have to be  fulfilled, with respec t  t o  factor  supplies and prices ,  f o r  in- 
s tance,  t o  give more positive expectations that ,  in turn, stimulate investment in 
those directions. So  f a r ,  the  innovation explanation can only give a good descrip- 
tion of the  process during the  upswing, once i t  has started. 
Another problem with the  concept of innovations is related to t h e  la rge  
differences in technological knowledge between countries. The normal situation is 
t ha t  some countries have a leading position, while o thers  follow at different rates. 
Only f o r  the leading countries are new, important innovations a necessary but not 
sufficient element f o r  t he  continuation of the i r  economic development. Normally, 
they cannot compete with the i r  fac tor  pr ices  because there  exists a r a t h e r  strong 
relationship between the  level of technological knowledge and the  wage rate. For 
t h e  o t h e r  countries this  necessity t o  search  f o r  new, important innovations i s  less 
strong,  because they can t r y  to ra i se  t he i r  level of knowledge to tha t  of the i r  pre-  
cursors by buying patents and licenses, or by copying certain products o r  organi- 
zational s t ructures ,  thus benefiting from the lower factor  costs. Although I en- 
do r se  t h e  statement tha t  the long wave is a n  international phenomenon, strongly in- 
fluenced by the leading, large countries, I also believe that if all t he  o t h e r  coun- 
t r i e s  behave according t o  the life-cycle hypothesis of international production, 
i.e., by upgrading the i r  s t ruc tu re  of production, using already existing technologi- 
ca l  knowledge, and taking advantage of lower costs, then the impact of t h e  long 
wave would be less than i t  actually is. Technological knowledge i s  available, a t  a 
cer ta in  pr ice  of course,  but combined with lower labor costs this must resu l t  in 
profitable production possibilities. That these occur  in certain periods and fail  in 
o t h e r s  is ,  t o  me, another indication tha t  i t  i s  not s o  much innovation as o the r  fac- 
tors tha t  are ultimately decisive f o r  a wave-like, long-term economic development. 
As is clear from Section 2, in some explanations the  role of investment i s  im- 
por tan t ,  especially in t he  approaches of Forres te r  and Van Duijn. In the  explana- 
tions tha t  stress the impact of innovations. the role and importance of investment 
i s  r a t h e r  neglected. Wrongly, because innovations need the medium of investment 
t o  become effective. 
There are two aspects  of investment I stress here. In the f i r s t  place, i t  is  
necessary,  in my opinion, t o  take  more account of the unpredictable element of 
"animal spirits". A s  is  w e l l  known, a n  investment decision is dependent on many 
variables,  such a s  interest  r a t e s ,  availability of innovations or new technological 
knowledge, and demand expectations; but i t  is also dependent on the  motivation o r  
willingness to take risks.  Sometimes, a situation can occur  in which the  more ob- 
jective factors  show quite similar values as in the past. Yet, t he  decision t o  invest 
can go a different way because of changes in the more subjective factors.  
The second point stresses t he  concept of time in relation to investment, in two 
ways. On the one hand, t h e r e  is a time lapse between t h e  decision to invest and the  
moment tha t  the  investment is completed o r ,  in the case of r a w  materials o r  semi- 
products,  the  o r d e r  i s  fulfilled. The introduction of this  kind of lag and delay, as 
is  done in the SDNM. increases  t he  level of reality of any explanation. On the  oth- 
er hand, and even more importantly, a realized investment not only positively influ- 
ences  t he  production capacity o r  the level of technological possibilities, but also 
has a negative impact. in the  sense tha t  in the long run i t  lowers t he  possibility of 
adjusting to changing circumstances. The higher the  volume of investment in a 
par t icu lar  industry o r  s ec to r  over  a particular period of time, t he  more expensive 
and more time consuming any change becomes, and s o  the  adjustment process can 
develop more slowly. In this  way, firms, industries, sectors ,  o r  even countries can 
experience the consequences of previous, large investment projects,  in t he  sense 
that ,  when necessary. disinvestment can be  a costly process,  both in economic and 
social terms. This creates a disadvantageous position with respec t  to those com- 
pe t i to rs  who have yet t o  start. Of course,  previous investments have contributed 
t o  economic growth, resulting in higher income, in higher technological knowledge 
('learning by doing'), and in more possibilities for  new research  m d  development, 
but in the  long run  they can hamper, because of vested interests,  t h e  necessary 
.process of adjustment when economic conditions begin t o  change fundamentally. 
In considering adjustment I come to the third point of my argument. Adjust- 
ment assumes changes in consumer demand, in technology, in competition with oth- 
er firms at home and abroad,  and in sectoral relationships, i.e., in all t he  internal 
and external  relationships in which a firm, an industry, a sec tor ,  o r  a country i s  
involved. I t  cannot be  s t ressed enough tha t  structural change i s  character is t ic  
of t h e  economic development of all  those countries who have passed the take-off 
phase of industrialization, I t s  influence is not limited t o  t he  so-called developing 
count r ies ;  i t  applies as much t o  t he  developed o r  industrialized countries of the  
western world and centrally planned economies. 
In my opinion, economic growth and s t r u c t ~ l  change are two sides of the  
same medal. Economic growth creates the  impulse f o r  change by raising the in- 
come level, and s o  changing consumer preferences; by raising more funds for  
r e s e a r c h  and development. f o r  investment, and f o r  providing be t t e r  educational 
facili t ies,  and s o  embodying new technology and the  benefits of increasing re turns  
of scale;  and by allowing g r e a t e r  use of the  international division of labor.  Howev- 
er, t h e  continuation of this  process  is strongly dependent on the  way these new op- 
portunities a r e  used, on whether t he  necessary investments are car r ied  out, and, 
especially important, on whether these investments are in t he  r ight  direction. By 
the  term t he  r igh t  direction. I mean tha t  t he  investments have t o  influence the  pro- 
cess of adjustment in such a way tha t  the  newly created s t ruc ture ,  b e  i t  on the  lev- 
el of a firm, an  industry, a sec to r ,  but especially of a country, i s  capable of pro- 
viding the  same facilities of employment and output growth as before.  In shor t ,  
economic growth creates s t ruc tura l  changes, but without incorporating these 
changes economic growth will slow down more and more. Accordingly, as economic 
growth continues in t he  upward phase of economic development, more and more is 
invested in the leading sec tors .  So  just at the  time when adjustment is needed t o  
r e a c t  to occurring changes, towards new leading sectors ,  t he re  are fewer possibil- 
i t ies,  both financial and social, to implement it. In the end, a stationary situation 
can occur .  
In reality,  countries differ in their  attitude toward adjustment. There is not 
much argument with the statement tha t  Japan adjusted be t te r  toward changes than 
did o the r  countries post World War 11. Therefore,  Japan has s o  f a r  withstood the  
impact of the  worldwide depression be t te r  than many o the r  countries. But the 
Japanese, too, were confronted with adjustment problems and with vested interests 
tha t  could not be changed without cost. Included in these vested interests  are ear- 
l ier investments in machines, plants, infrastructure,  and human capital, tha t  lost 
profitability because of changes in t he  consumption or production spheres ,  both 
inland or abroad. Also, t he  institutional s t ruc ture  resembles vested interests  in 
that  i t  cannot change without losses (for some). A s  long as the  costs of implement- 
ing changes combined with insecure profit  expectations are valued higher than 
those of remaining s tat ic ,  be  this a private o r  public judgment, t he  necessary ad- 
justments will not be executed. The consequence is slower growth or even higher 
costs of adjustment in t he  future and less opportunities f o r  reorganizing the  old 
economic situation. 
With regard  to t he  chosen methodology, the fourth and last point of my argu- 
ment, I give h e r e  a few remarks about the SDNM approach.  The two o ther  main 
methods used f o r  research  on long waves are r a t h e r  well-known. One method 
comprises the  more verbal  description, in which a theory is constructed based on 
a logic sequence of valid arguments, sometimes supplemented with real-life exam- 
ples. The o ther  method i s  the  statistical/mathematical one, which rel ies  heavily on 
the availability of data  and of statistical methods. A weak element of this  approach 
is t he  interpretation of the  results.  To overcome both shortcomings, a research  
group, under t he  guidance of Forres te r ,  c rea ted  the  already described SDNM, in 
which, on the  basis of cer tain assumptions regarding human decision-making, 
several cycles could be  generated tha t  are superimposed on a long wave. In this  
way they were not dependent on the  quality and/or quantity of data  and statistical 
methods available. 
If the  chosen mechanisms are the r ight  ones, if no important mechanism is for- 
gotten, and especially if t he  microeconomic behavior of all  the agents i s  translated 
into the  model correct ly  then this  method may be  judged as acceptable in long wave 
analysis. The question now is, whether all these statements can be  answered posi- 
tively. My answer must be in the  negative. Although I underline the  importance of 
the self-ordering mechanism, I am of the  opinion tha t  o the r  mechanisms a r e ,  at 
least, equally important. In this  respect ,  the  influence of new technologies and i ts  
gradual working through the  whole economic and social s t ruc ture ,  and the ongoing 
changes in rival countries, are both mechanisms tha t  have t o  be incorporated. As- 
suming technological progress  as an exogenous variable,  with a uniform growth 
r a t e ,  gives the  same unrealistic description of this  phenomenon as in many of the  
older growth models. 
Another point of criticism applies to the  translation of microeconomic 
behavior into the  model. Of course,  i t  is  a r ea l  improvement tha t ,  unlike in the  
more neoclassical oriented economic theory, i t  i s  not assumed tha t  economic 
agents have perfect  and costIess information or t ha t  they a r e  acting as optimizers. 
However, t he  model assumes, as f a r  as I am aware, a constancy in human behavior, 
while in reality changes occur  tha t  can greatly influence economic development. 
Already, changes in "animal spirits" regarding entrepreneurial  behavior have 
been noticed, but changes in expectations about t he  future,  and s o  about decisions 
t o  be made, a r e  relevant f o r  a l l  economic agents. They can c rea t e  an  atmosphere 
in which self-fulfilling prophecies,  both positive and negative, can be  realized. 
In this  sho r t  section I have reviewed some elements I judge as crucial. In the  
next section, I t r y  t o  sketch a coherent,  theoretical framework f o r  explaining the  
long wave development of industrialized countries, in which economic growth, 
structural  change, and changing international economic relations are the crucial 
elements. 
4. The Interplay between Economic Growth and Structural Change 
In this section I descr ibe the  processes of economic development f o r  the more 
developed, industrialized countries,  showing why i t  is inevitable t ha t  periods of re- 
latively high growth and of stagnation alternate.  In my view, the  crucial relation- 
ship is tha t  between economic growth and s tructural  change, in t he  sense that  
economic growth is a necessary condition f o r  s t ructural  change, while s t ruc tura l  
change is, in i t s  turn. a necessary condition f o r  prolonged economic growth. A s  
long as this  relationship holds, the  process of economic development evolves 
steadily, with prosperous figures f o r  most of the economic indicators. However, 
fo r  two reasons this process cannot continue indefinitely. On the  one hand, struc- 
tural  change slows down because of previous investments in firms, industries. o r  
sec tors  tha t  are no longer profitable because of a change in the  relative competi- 
tive position, but tha t  cannot be withdrawn without costs;  s t ruc tura l  change also 
slows down because of growing organizational and institutional sclerosis.  On the 
o ther  hand, s t ruc tura l  change has t o  be brought about as soon as (new) competi- 
tors start t o  provide the  market with the  same products, but of lower pr ice  and/or 
be t t e r  quality, o r  when demand shows a secular decline. A t  t ha t  moment t he  deci- 
sion has to be  made to adjust one's own production t o  r e s t o r e  the  competitiveness 
o r  to change the  s t ruc ture  of production into o the r  directions. The necessity f o r  
these changes conflicts strongly with the growing resis tance to change on the  pa r t  
of t he  production s t ruc ture .  A s  long as this conflict i s  not resolved, i.e., as long 
as t he  production s t ruc tu re  in the  broadest sense has not adjusted to t he  new cir- 
cumstances, the  period of stagnating economic development continues. 
In this analysis, t he  s t ruc tu re  of production, in t he  broadest sense, and tha t  
of consumption, as well a s  t he  organizational and institutional shaping of the 
economic process,  both at home and abroad,  a r e  the  basic elements. The introduc- 
tion of countries abroad into the  model means tha t  one has  t o  take account of bal- 
ance of payments constraints,  exchange r a t e s ,  wage and productivity differences, 
and the  more general p r ice  and quality differences between equal products from 
several  countries. With r ega rd  to t he  s t ruc ture  of production and consumption, 
t he re  a r e  several  ways of dividing the  economic s t ruc tu re  into various sec tors  o r  
industries. First ,  a division between competitive and shel tered sec tors  can be made 
according t o  t he i r  exposure t o  competition from o the r  countries. Second. sec tors  
o r  industries can be  divided according to the i r  dependence on final demand. Nor- 
mally, a division i s  applied between consumer-good and capital-good production 
sec tors ,  but in reality a whole spectrum of intermediate positions occurs.  The 
more an industry has a capital-good production cha rac t e r ,  the more i t  usually has 
to invest in i t s  production capacity,  and thus the  more difficulties i t  has  in adapt- 
ing to t he  necessary changes. Third, a division can be made according t o  the 
s tatus  of leading and following sectors. In each period, cer ta in  sec tors  show a re-  
latively high growth r a t e  because of strong final and/or  intermediate/investment 
demand by o the r  sectors .  In these sectors ,  t h e  development of productivity, 
pr ices ,  and employment is on the  whole different from those sec to r s  tha t  are more 
following. And, fourth,  a division according t o  technological content is possible. 
A s  already s tated countries show differences in t h e i r  level of technological 
knowledge and in the i r  ability t o  use i t .  Some countries lead, while most countries 
follow at a lesser  o r  g rea t e r  distance. Each country s t r ives  f o r  an  improvement in 
i t s  position in this  sequence. A country can t r y  t o  improve i t s  technological 
knowledge and s o  c r e a t e  the  possibility of making new o r  b e t t e r  products of higher 
value, to gain a leading position o r  to keep at the  same level as i ts  competitors. 
Which sectoral  division is appropriate  depends on the  kind of questions t o  be  
answered. 
The s t ruc ture  of both the production and consumption changes as time passes. 
The s t ruc ture  of consumption undergoes changes mainly because of rising income 
and i ts  consequences, as described by Engel's Law, which implies a change in con- 
sumption expenditures from basic necessities, such as food, to more luxury pro- 
ducts. To a l esser  extent expenditures are also influenced by relative prices.  If 
w e  consider only one country, then this change in consumption alone would necessi- 
t a t e  a corresponding change in the s t ruc ture  of production. With the  introduction 
of o t h e r  countries to the  model, this necessity increases  because, in t he  long run ,  
an equilibrium position on the balance of payments has  to be reached. 
The s t ruc ture  of production experiences influences from several  directions. 
Apart from the already mentioned changes in the  s t ruc tu re  of consumption and in 
the possibility tha t  new competitors en t e r  the market - a very s t rong influence - 
o t h e r  factors ,  equally important, are the availability and pr ice  of production in- 
puts, the technological development, and the  economies of scale. In t he  process  of 
production several  production inputs a r e  used, such as labor,  capital  through in- 
vestment, energy, r a w  materials, and intermediate products. These production in- 
puts a r e  not always in equilibrium between supply and demand. On the  cont ra ry ,  
s t ruc tura l  discrepancies between supply and demand o r  sudden price increases  of 
an  input can c r e a t e  influential disequilibria on the  several  markets, which then 
work through the  whole system. Each situation of s t ruc tura l  disequilibrium re- 
quires  a certain kind of adjustment, with sometimes unpredictable consequences. 
This creates uncertainty and thus influences fu ture  expectations negatively. Tech- 
nological development is one of the  main determinants in the  whole process.  I t s  
rate of growth determines the productivity growth r a t e ,  and s o  the  possibility of 
changing relative pr ices ,  in a decisive way. The growth rate of technological 
development i s  mainly dependent on the expenditures f o r  research  and develop- 
ment and on the  amount invested in the  production process  t o  apply product o r  
process  innovations. The volume of investment depends positively on the  volume of 
demand. 
This growth of investment in i t s  tu rn  creates fu r the r  possibilities f o r  
economies of scale,  possibilities realized in those sec to r s  tha t  can ra i se  the i r  out- 
put level because of rising demand in an  existing market or by creat ing new mark- 
ets, f o r  instance through more exports.  
To clarify this  line of reasoning, the  main relationships a r e  summarized in two 
figures. In Figure I, the situation i s  described f o r  a closed economy. I t  i s  possible 
to distinguish between new, increasing, stagnating, and declining products,  indus- 
t r ies ,  o r  sectors .  For each unit, the development along the  several  phases of t h e  
product-life cycle is mainly determined through the  interplay of demand fac tors  - 
income elasticity (Engel's law) and disposable income - on the  one hand, and supply 
fac tors  - quantity, quality, and pr ice  of production factors ,  intermediate 
deliveries and resources,  and technological development - on the  o ther .  This 
resul ts  in a specific pat tern of productivity and p r i c e  and quality development, 
and s o  of realized sales, employment, and profits.  
Simply because of economic growth, each product moves along the  relevant 
product cycle, implying changes in the  use of capital  and labor.  Some products in- 
c r ease  the i r  demand f o r  production factors;  o thers ,  however, decrease  the i r  
demand, which leads to redundant capital stock and the  discharging of labor.  When 
the  respect ive increases and decreases  in demand f o r  production f ac to r s  match 
each o the r  exactly, in time, in quantity, in quality, and in place, i.e., when s truc-  
tu ra l  changes in the  several  f ac to r  markets a r e  realized, then an important condi- 
tion f o r  t h e  continuation of growth is realized. However, another  condition, equal- 
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Figure I .  The relationship between economic growth and structural change in a 
closed economy. 
ly necessary, is the  introduction of new products on the  market to secu re  growth 
possibilities. 
Whether all these necessary adjustments are made is strongly dependent on 
the  way tha t  different firms view the  developments, and how they t ranslate  t h e i r  
observations into investment behavior and into market policy with r e spec t  to 
pr ices  and sales. Both investors and consumers must also continue to have positive 
expectations about the future ,  because otherwise t h e  lack of demand negatively in- 
fluences t he  expectations of o the r  actors. 
In t he  second scheme, t h e  r a t h e r  unrealistic assumption of a closed economy 
i s  removed. Four different elements have to be  taken into account in this respec t .  
There i s  probably no country in t he  world t ha t  does not have to re ly  on o t h e r  
countries.  This implies - and this is  t h e  f i r s t  element - tha t  t r ade  occurs  in those 
products t ha t  cannot be  produced in a country. Some natural resources and agri-  
cul tural  products belong to this category. For  t h e  second element, t rnde  in indus- 
trialized products, the  character is t ic  of not being able  to produce one's own goods 
is  in m o s t  cases not relevant. Although t h e r e  are important differences in techno- 
logical knowledge between countries - see the  third element - a major p a r t  of t he  
t r ade  in industrial products occurs  even when t h e  importing country has  t h e  po- 
tential  to produce such products internally, or even actually produces and expor t s  
them (intra-industry trade).  Trade in industrial products is  caused by t h e  interna- 
tional division of labor,  making use of t he  possibility of specialization, by impor- 
t an t  differences in factor rewards between countries,  especially with r e g a r d  to la- 
bor.  and by the  established fact t ha t  with a higher  income t h e r e  occurs a s t ronge r  
prefe rence  for products from o ther  countries because of quality differences (the 
Linder effect). A s  stated already - and this  is t h e  third element - t h e r e  are major 
differences in technological knowledge between countries. Some have a leading 
position. operating on t h e  technological frontier.  Normally, new products  are in- 
troduced in these countries, because of the  available knowledge to produce them 
and because of a suitable market in which to sell  them. Behind the  leaders.  t h e  
o t h e r  countries follow successively, some not far behind and some way back from 
tha t  leader .  This o rde r  is, of course. not fixed. Countries with a technological lag 
t r y  to catch up with the technological leader ,  as was very visible post World W a r  
11, through the i r  own research  and development, but especially through buying pa- 
tents  and licenses. Combined with lower labor  costs,  they can achieve a very  com- 
petitive position on markets tha t  had been held by those countries with a techno- 
logical lead. Conversely, the  leading countries try to hold the i r  position or even 
improve upon it  by commanding enough funds fo r  r e sea rch  and development. The 
fourth element, t ha t  of di rec t  investments abroad,  once again s t rengthens t h e  pos- 
sibility of changes in the relative o r d e r  with r e spec t  to technology. Direct invest- 
ment in t h e  host country, whether or not with a positive influence for t ha t  econo- 
my, implies t ha t  investment in t he  home country is lower than otherwise possible. 
In th i s  way, d i rec t  investments can negatively influence the  economy in which t h e  
funds originated. The introduction of an  open economy increases  t h e  number of 
factors t ha t  m u s e  s t ructural  changes, in comparison with closed economies, such 
as in Figure I. In Figure 11, t he  situation is sketched for an  economy with ex te rna l  
relations with t he  rest of the  world. Five different relationships can be  indicated. 
The relations between the  severa l  production s t ruc tures  are indicated with an  
A. A s  described, they range f r o m  tradeflows of physical production-inputs to 
shifts of technological knowledge, whether or not combined with d i rec t  invest- 
ments. These relations can change the  process  of adjustment within t h e  respect ive 
countr ies  as well as in the i r  relative position. If t h e r e  are less funds available f o r  
the investment necessary to incorporate new technology or to create i t ,  or to fol- 
l o w  changes in consumption pat terns ,  because these  funds are used in o the r  coun- 
t r ies ,  then the  income generated will be  lower than otherwise, and so less funds 
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Figure 11. The relationship between economic growth and s t ructural  change of pro- 
duction and consumption in a n  interconnected world. 
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are available in t he  future.  The reverse  is,  of course,  also possible. 
The relations under B describe the  "keeping up with the Jones"' effect a t  the  
national level. The consumption pat tern of the technological leader forms the blue- 
pr in t  f o r  the o ther  economies. They follow with a certain delay, the i r  consumption 
pat tern is often, r a t h e r  advanced compared with the  existing s t ruc ture  of produc- 
tion. 
C indicates t he  relations tha t  represent  t he  flows of products produced in a 
part icular  area and consumed in tha t  same a rea .  This means tha t  these products 
have a quality and price t ha t  is judged preferable  to those from other  countries. 
This by no means implies a stable situation. Changing consumer preferences,  o r  a 
relat ive change in the  technological ordering, and/or changes in productivity, 
respective input pr ices ,  and exchange rates, are elements tha t  continuously e x e r t  
p ressures  on the  production s t ruc ture  to adjust in o r d e r  to continue the  process 
of growth and to prevent unemployment. 
Otherwise, and this i s  represented by the  relations under D, changes in inter- 
national t rade  flows occur ,  which can c o r r e c t  the  absence of cer tain adjustments. 
Possibilities of this  nature a r e ,  f o r  a country, r a t h e r  limited because of the  bal- 
ance  of payments constraint. International t r ade  relations can be a danger to the  
national economy, as when consumers and investors show an increasing preference 
f o r  t he  lower pr ice and/or the  be t te r  quality of products from abroad. 
From this more schematic description, i t  has  hopefully become c lear  t o  t he  
r e a d e r  how extensive are the  variety of changes and the possible determinants 
tha t  occur  in the  process of economic development. Such and analysis renders  t he  
questions of whether these changes are realized correct ly ,  and if not what the  
consequences are and how they can be  neutralized, even more pregnant. A possi- 
ble  scenario is given in section 5. 
5. A Sketch of a Possible Explanation of the Long Wave 
In this section, I sketch briefly a long wave process  of economic development 
in which endogenous fac tors  are ultimately responsible fo r  t he  alternation of up- 
and down-swing. 
In this  description of economic development according t o  a long wave pat tern,  
in which I incorporate no s t r i c t  time pa t te rn ,  I discern the  four  usual phases of the  
cycle: recovery, prosperity,  recession, and depression. 
A graphic representation is given in Figure 111. The cycle shows the  smoothed 
deviations from the  long-term trend. The dating of t he  phases i s  connected with 
t h e  points of inflection on this cycle. The phases of prosperity and of depression 
show a more o r  less uniform pat tern of deviation development, be  i t  positive o r  
negative. The o ther  two phases show the  transition of the  positive development of 
t h e  deviations into the  negative era and vice versa.  Whether these phases of t ran-  
sition, recovery,  and recession start at t h e  points indicated is problematic. In t he  
case of recovery,  f o r  instance, growth has not ye t  reached the  level of long-term 
growth. However, just as with the famous acce lera tor  mechanism, a smaller de- 
cline than before can have a profound influence on the  expectations of the several  
economic actors ,  and s o  on the  decisions made. Once investment, as the  most im- 
por tan t  determinant, has s ta r ted  t o  r i se ,  making the development of new sec tors  
possible, the whole situation changes drastically. With regard  t o  t h e  length of the  
cycle,  t he  major differences between the  several  cycles are caused in t he  phases 
of recession and depression. In these phases,  human decision-making i s  decisive, 
while in the upward phase the  technoeconomic forces  ultimately influence the  pace 
of development. Therefore,  t h ree  different cycles are sketched as examples, each 
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Figure 111. Possible courses of a long wave-like development, showing smoothed de- 
viations of the  long-term trend, and the  dating of several  phases. 
equally probable. 
The phase of recovety  is said t o  start at t ha t  moment when severa l  necessary 
requirements f o r  growth are fulfilled, requirements with regard  to a broad range 
of (non)economic variables. The most important requirement to be  met is  t ha t  t he  
s t ruc tu re  of production, fo r  intermediate and final demand, and the  s t ruc tu re  of 
consumption be  more or less comparable, with a stable balance of payments. This 
means t ha t  the  production s t ruc ture  has  adjusted as close as possible to t h e  re- 
quirements of the  consumption s t ructure .  inland as well as abroad,  in t h e  sense 
tha t  t he  structurally unprofitable p a r t s  were scrapped in the preceding phase of 
depression. The nonprofitability w a s  caused e i t he r  by declining consumer demand, 
because of saturation when income w a s  ra ised,  or by the  r i s e  in competitiveness in 
these sec tors  in o the r  countries. This scrapping inevitably meant not only tha t  
capital  goods, machines, buildings, etc. ,  were made redundant, but a lso t ha t  l abor ,  
once employed in these sectors ,  had to move to other  segments during a time of 
high unemployment a consequence difficult t o  accept .  More general organizational 
and institutional changes were equally required. This process of scrapping does 
not work out smoothly and gradually. I t  i s  costly, from the economic and social 
viewpoint, and people, be  i t  investors, l aborers ,  or society in general,  will firmly 
res i s t  in the  f i r s t  instances. A t  such times, t he  costs of changing are valued higher  
than those of retaining the  s ta tus  quo. After a period, the  length of which is  
dependent on the  importance of the  old s t ruc tures ,  however, changes occur .  The 
investors cut t h e i r  losses, laborers  lose the i r  jobs, and, also at t h e  institutional 
level old positions are given up. Sometimes, th i s  process  of scrapping, of accept- 
ing t h e  necessity of changes, can'be accelerated by major events, of which w a r  has  
been t h e  most prominent, but also the most t e r r ib le  one. Such an event shakes  the  
whole society to i t s  c o r e  and creates an  environment in which even major changes 
are acceptable. In this  respec t ,  it is remarkable t o  s ee  that  the  two countries who 
lost World War 11, with t he  resultant enormous destruction and completely disar- 
ranged social s t ruc ture ,  Japan and Germany, have shown the  most prosperous 
economic development. 
The second main requirement is a change in motivation. I am of t he  opinion. 
tha t  motivation - the  at t i tude to look fo r  something new, to take r isks ,  t o  change, 
i.e. entrepreneurship in t he  widest sense - is  a major determinant in economic 
development, too much neglected in economic theory, not s o  much with respec t  t o  
investors, but with respec t  t o  all  those whose cooperation i s  needed to make an  in- 
vestment successful. Of course,  this  determinant i s  strongly connected with the  
f i r s t  one, but i t  has  i t s  own value. Most of the  changes needed involve the  
cooperation of a l l  those concerned, b e  it on the  level of a firm, a sec tor ,  or a na- 
tional state with r ega rd  t o  changes in the social infrastructure.  Also, here ,  
changes imply losses f o r  some participants, especially in t he  s h o r t  term. These 
changes a r e ,  however, necessary to realize cer tain long-term goals. If the  
cooperation is not present ,  if t h e r e  is no motivation to change, then the  implement- 
ed changes will fail t o  achieve the  desired goals. Examples of periods in which 
motivation has had an  important influence a r e  the period after World War 11, the  
so-called "postwar reconstruction" period in Europe, and the Japanese way of or-  
ganization in more r ecen t  times. 
The question now a r i s e s  whether something can be  said about the  major influ- 
ences  on the willingness to adjust and t h e  motivation t o  execute. Several  argu- 
ments in this respec t  can  be  given. On the  national level, the  pr ice  f o r  t h e  major 
production factors,  capital ,  and labor ,  showns a relative decrease  during the  
preceding years  of recession and depression, because supply w a s  l a rge r  than 
demand f o r  a longer period of time. These conditions lower t he  r i sks  of new invest- 
ments, investments tha t  can  draw from a reservoi r  of new technological knowledge, 
and product and process  innovations. These innovations are sometimes known al- 
ready,  but have s o  f a r  not been implemented because of the  unfavorable economic 
situation. Another impulse can be  given through government investments in t h e  in- 
f ras t ruc ture ,  a measure tha t  can have a positive influence on fu ture  expectations 
and s o  on general motivation. 
But the  most important reason f o r  entering a period of recovery i s  t ha t  t he  
majority of the  industrialized countries show the  same positive developments. I t  is  
impossible f o r  any country t o  recover  successfully on its own. The demand f o r  im- 
ported products c rea ted  in o the r  countries can yield very positive resul ts ,  if and 
only if the basic requirements in t he  exporting country - an adjusted production 
s t ruc tu re  and a positive motivation - are fulfilled. If this  is the  case,  t he  coun- 
t r i e s  involved can have a very positive influence on each o ther ,  in such a way tha t  
the  economic development of t h e  industrialized world increases. 
A t  t he  end of t he  phase of recovery,  entering the  period of prosperity, in 
many countries cer tain recognizable sectors show a r e a l  breakthrough in the i r  
development. Until this  point, these sectors have gone through a period of very ri- 
sky investments, with many experimentations and also with the  overcoming of major 
problems in the technical sphere ,  in t he  way the  process  of production i s  organ- 
ized, and/or in the  way tha t  society is equipped t o  r e a p  the  f ru i t s  of these develop- 
ments. 
But as soon as t h e  demanding side, be  i t  consumer f o r  final demand o r  o the r  
producers  in the case  of capital- o r  intermediate-goods, has realized the  special, 
new cha rac t e r  of t he  products of these sectors ,  a process of fast growth develops. 
This s t rong demand enables the  sec to r  t o  realize fu r the r  investments, s o  strongly 
influencing productivity growth and relative prices.  Lower pr ices  strengthen 
demand even more, and so a vicious circle  of development becomes possible. 
The influence of leading sectors is, however, not res t r ic ted  to these specific 
sec tors  themselves. Because of strong backward- and forwarding-linkages they in- 
fluence o the r  sec tors ,  and s o  t h e  economic s t ruc tu re  in general ,  profoundly. On 
the  one hand, t he i r  demand f o r  inputs is strong, s o  creat ing economies of scale in 
t he  delivering sectors. On t h e  o ther  hand, when t h e  leading sector produces a ma- 
jor new capital good, i t  gives a strong impulse to o t h e r  sectors to adjust,  not only 
by lowering the  cost  of production, but still more by creat ing new, unforeseen pos- 
sibilities f o r  new products  and/or  new markets. 
All these investments and t h e  increasine demand have, of course,  t he i r  normal 
multiplier influences on t h e  economy. The resultant s t rong demand f o r  t h e  produc- 
tion factors ,  capi ta l  and labor  can be  m e t  in t h e  f i r s t  instance r a t h e r  easily. 
Money-lenders are e a g e r  to profit  from the  positive economic development. The 
labor  force  moves into these  new sectors. in t he  beginning a t t r ac t ed  by the  avail- 
able  job opportunities. But eventually demand comes close to supply. The resul- 
tant  increases in in te res t  and wages, especially through demands in the  s t ronger ,  
leading sectors, create a fu r the r  impulse f o r  production f ac to r s  to move from t h e  
lower profit  sectors to t h e  higher profit ,  fas t  growing sectors. These high prof i t  
sectors ,  with the i r  high productivity growth, can more easily pay the  high wages 
than can those o the r  sectors with a more lagging development. 
However, a period of prosperity does not only have developments with posi- 
t ive consequences. I t  produces also t he  seeds t ha t  eventually begin to cr ipple  t h e  
process  of economic development. From the  time of recovery on,  t h e  s t ruc tu re  of 
production i s  charac te r ized  by la rge  and continuous changes in t h e  creation of 
new products and markets  and/or  in applying new production methods. This 
behavior, directed at changes, receives  a new impulse when t h e  pr ices  f o r  l abor  
and capital start to r i se .  However, as already said, only t h e  f a s t  growing sectors 
are able to pay these  increases  through productivity growth. This reduces t he i r  
ability to lower t h e i r  p r ices  fu r the r  and s o  to explore  new markets.  I t  a lso brings 
about a change in t h e i r  investment policies. So  f a r ,  product  innovations a r e  amply 
implemented. but gradually process  innovations obtain t h e  upper  hand. The reason 
f o r  a st ronger  emphasis on process  innovations i s  t h a t  investors become more in- 
t e res ted  in protecting t h e  already realized investment pro jec t s  than in s tar t ing 
new, risky projects.  For  o the r  sectors t he  increases  in f ac to r  p r ices  can only be  
met by pr ice  increases  and/or  forced process innovations. These higher pr ices  in- 
fluence, in the i r  t u rn ,  t h e  general p r ice  level of t h e  economy in a negative way. 
The application of p roces s  innovations normally means t h e  loss of employment op- 
portunities, a loss t h a t  a t  t h e  time, however, is  not rea l ly  a problem. The change 
in t h e  cha rac t e r  of innovations, the  r i s e  of t h e  production f ac to r  pr ices ,  and t h e  
increase in t he  general  p r i ce  level a r e  t h e  f i r s t ,  not unimportant, signs t ha t  t h e  
process  of economic development is undergoing a change in cha rac t e r ,  in which 
t h e  process  of adjustment of t h e  economic s t ruc tu re  starts to s l o w  down. And th i s  
occurs  just when a n  even a higher pace of adjustment is nmded,  f o r  two reasons.  
The f i r s t  is t h a t  in t h e  phase of recovery and also in t h e  beginning of t h e  
prosperi ty  phase t h e  s t ruc tu re  of consumption remains r a t h e r  stable.  The high 
rate of unemployment, to a l a rge  extent,  prevents  r e a l  wage rises. A s  soon as th i s  
situation changes, however, s t rong wage increases  are demanded and agreed,  ra is-  
ing t h e  level of p e r  capi ta  income, and so  changing t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of consumption. 
Also the  relative p r i ce  developments, favorable for t h e  f a s t  growing sec tors ,  
cause changes in t h e  consumption s t ructure .  Another consequence of the  p e r  capi- 
ta income r i s e  is  t h a t  consumers show a grea t e r  p re fe rence  f o r  products from oth- 
er countries, not only because of possible pr ice  differences,  but also because of 
quality, and nonprice character is t ics .  A s  long as th i s  loss of internal demand can 
b e  compensated through higher expor t  sales,  no rea l  problems occur.  On t h e  con- 
t r a r y ,  all  the  countries involved can, in theory, profit  f r o m  t he  resul tant  
economies of scale and f r o m  the  s t ronger  international division of labor. The main 
question is whether t he  existing national s t ruc ture  of production is  optimal in 
c rea t ing  the  right products in t h e  r i gh t  way, to participate optimally in this  pro- 
cess, so to realize fully t h e  theoretical possibilities. 
The second main reason why a s t ronge r  pace of adjustment is  needed r e l a t e s  
to t h e  growth of o the r  countries,  in t w o  ways. On the  one hand, t he  fastest growing 
countr ies  show the s a m e  virtuous c i rc le  of development, as already described for 
ce r t a in  sectors:  s t rong demand creates sufficient funds for investment, which 
stimulates productivity growth and lowers pr ices ,  influencing demand once again 
positively. Those countr ies  with such a development have much be t t e r  opportuni- 
t i e s  to adjust than those who are in t h e  vicious circle  of demand: slow growth of 
demand, less funds f o r  investment, with only small productivity increases t ha t  do  
not resu l t  in a st ronger  competitive position and so do not create new demand. The 
slow growing countries, s tar t ing in a bad position, have no r e a l  opportunity to 
make up the i r  arrears. But t h e  dangers  do  not only emanate from competitors with 
a good starting position and a strong economic growth. The strong economic growth 
of t h e  more industrialized world in general induces severa l  not yet  industrialized 
countr ies  to start to part ic ipate  too  in t ha t  development. This is  the  o t h e r  side of 
t h e  process  tha t  urges for adjustment. Because of very favorable conditions with 
r e g a r d  to factor prices ,  i.e., low labor  costs and the  available low-level technolo- 
gy, mostly due to t h e  d i r ec t  investment of multi-national companies, these  coun- 
t r i e s  can induce, in this  way, a fas t  p rocess  of industrialization. When s ta r ted ,  this  
p roces s  can create funds for new investment allowing fu r the r  industrialization. 
The friction between the  actual  slower adjustment of t h e  s t ruc ture  of produc- 
t ion on  the  one hand, and t h e  s t ronge r  adjustment requirements on the  o the r ,  rang- 
ing from changes in t h e  s t ruc tu re  of consumption to t he  entrance of new competi- 
tors on the  world market,  influences fu ture  expectations negatively, creates unem- 
ployment, undermines prof i ts ,  and, more generally, lowers t h e  motivation of t h e  
s eve ra l  economic actors. Instead of realizing the  necessary adjustments, partici-  
pan ts  in t he  economic process ,  investors,  entrepreneurs ,  l aborersB organizations, 
etc., t ake  a more defensive att i tude to prevent  a fu r the r  eroding of t he i r  (profita- 
bility) position. 
National demand slows down, especially because of declining investments. The 
end resul t  is  tha t  l a r g e r  losses occu r  than otherwise would have been the  case.  
The situation de te r iora tes  even f u r t h e r  because adjustment pressures  are fe l t  in 
mos t  of the  countries involved in t h e  world economic system. Although t h e r e  are, 
sometimes important, differences,  each  country has in a quite similar and growing 
gap  between the  actual  and t h e  needed s t ruc tures  of production. This economic 
contract ion reduces f u r t h e r  t h e  growth of international t rade ,  and so t h a t  of ex- 
p o r t  demand for individual countries. A period of recession becomes inevitable. 
This period of recession is ,  in t h e  f i r s t  instance, character ized by high in- 
terest rates and high wages. Investors and/or companies are more act ive in pro- 
tect ing the i r  existing pro jec t s  - through government subsidies, protection against 
competitors f r o m  o t h e r  countries,  and streamlining the  production process  as 
much as possible - than they are in creat ing new projects  and realizing t h e  neces- 
s a r y  changes. Consumers react slower to t h e  changing tides. The change in t he  
consumption s t ruc ture  prevai ls  for a while, before  i t  i s  realized tha t  t h e  economic 
circumstances have changed so drastically tha t  a continuation of the  old ways is  
impossible. With creeping unemployment, l aborers  are not s o  willing anymore to 
move, thus  contributing to a rigid l abo r  market. Organizations and, more general-  
ly,  commonly accepted policies, constructed in periods of high growth and having 
contributed t o  the success in a not unimportant manner, cannot really handle these 
new circumstances, and take  also a defensive position. In shor t ,  t h e  economic 
development stagnates with all  t he  negative consequences on income, employment, 
and output, and nothing seems to have enough power to stop this.  
This phase of recession shades off into tha t  of depression when the  pr ices  for 
c r ed i t  and labor start to go down, but especially when noncompetitive firms and/or 
sec tors  go bankrupt. In the i r  ultimate decline, they drag o the r  firms with them. 
Unemployment r i ses  very  fas t ,  which resul ts  in a s t ronger  pressure  on govern- 
ments t o  assist  firms and/or sectors in trouble t o  protect  t he  remaining jobs. How- 
e v e r  socially acceptable such a policy may be, i t  d is t racts  funds f r o m  possible 
areas t ha t  could have been more profitable, in the  long run. f o r  t h e  whole of so- 
ciety,  by realizing the  necessary adjustments in t he  s t ruc tu re  of production. The 
resistance of society against these measures is normally al ready very strong. To 
close down cer ta in  firms or even to liquidate whole sec tors  is,  however, a harsh 
measure at a time when unemployment rates are still rising. F r o m  t h e  economic 
point of view, only through taking these kinds of measures is  i t  possible t o  achieve 
a s tar t ing point tha t  is  favorable f o r  a new recovery phase. I t  i s  c l ea r ,  however. 
t ha t  this  process of adjustment is  long, painful, and sometimes also dangerous. A s  
historical experience has shown and shows now once again, t he  phases of recession 
and depression have a strong influence on public opinion. During a depression the  
economy erodes the  basic values of 200 years  of industrial civilization i.e., the  
s t r ive  toward growth and the  enjoyment of i ts  fruits.  This erosion has  a negative 
effect  on people's attitudes. A conservative, defensive at t i tude gains t h e  upper  
hand, an atti tude tha t  is  not only res t r ic ted  to economic a r ea s ,  but  also to t he  so- 
cial  and political organizations as well. In such a climate, nationalistic feelings 
are stimulated strongly, creat ing an  atmosphere in which more and more internal 
and external  pressures  are used to defend t h e  interests  of cer ta in  groups inside a 
country or of a cer ta in  country against others .  In such a climate, aggressive or 
even fascist-oriented ideas can  have a decisive influence if no real alternatives 
are available to overcome t h e  problems just described. I t  is t he re fo re  necessary 
to construct  a policy t h a t  is effective and acceptable,  effective in realizing t h e  re- 
quired adjustments and acceptable  in t ha t  i t  makes clear what t h e  costs and bene- 
f i t s  of this  policy are compared with o the r  possibilities. In such a program, i t  has  
t o  b e  made c lear  tha t  cer ta in  adjustments, however painful f o r  cer ta in  groups, 
have to be  car r ied  out to provide a more positive, long-term development, but  
equally, i t  has to be  made clear why these adjustments are necessary and what the 
reasoning behind the  policy is. One thing i s  c lear :  t he  longer one holds back from 
such a policy, the  more painful t h e  adjustments are. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
To conclude this working paper ,  I use this  final section not just to r e p e a t  t he  
main line of the  argument, but  a lso to present  some thoughts on a desired economic 
development. 
In my opinion, industrialized countries show a long wave pa t te rn  with a dura- 
tion between 40 and 60 years .  The main reason behind this  pa t t e rn  is  t he  al terna-  
tion of periods with strong and fas t  changes in t he  structure of production - h e r e  
used in t he  widest sense, comprising t h e  whole of economic, technological, organi- 
zational, and institutional relations as perceived in a country - and periods with 
no or slow changes only. Developments in t he  field of technological p rogress ,  and 
later on in the  s t ruc ture  of consumption, and especially in t he  s t ruc tu re s  of pro- 
duction of other  countries, requi re ,  however, a continuous process  of adjustment 
in t h e  s t ruc ture  of production. That this  does not happen i s  because of t he  impos- 
sibility t o  keep the  motivation of all  t h e  economic actors operating at such a level 
as is  necessary f o r  the  process  of adjustment. In cer ta in  periods, this motivation 
is  clearly present,  but as soon as vested interests  become important and/or as 
soon as these interests  are threatened because of continuing changes elsewhere, 
t he  positive motivation to change a l t e r s  t o  a more defensive one, which t r i e s  to re- 
tain t he  status quo as long as possible. The s t ronger  t h e  optimistic with respect  to 
t he  defensive mood, the  longer the  duration of t he  upward with respec t  to t he  
downward phase. 
That the long wave is  an  international phenomenon, with a remarkable 
correspondence, can be  explained by the  fac t  that ,  on t he  one hand, sometimes ma- 
jor events influence a l a rge  number of countries at t h e  same time, and, on the  oth- 
er  hand, that  t he  differences in growth and change between countries is  fe l t  by all 
those participating in t h e  world economy. An example of the  f i r s t  explanation i s  
World War 11, which shook societies t o  t he i r  core ,  thus creat ing a very strong 
demand -and making possible major changes in t he  social and institutional fmme- 
works. An example of t h e  second explanation is  Japan and, to a lesser extent,  t h e  
NICs. 
A long wave starts i t s  upward phase when a majority of t h e  countries, with 
r e spec t  t o  t he i r  economic importance, have reached a kind of equilibrium between 
t h e i r  production and consumption s t ructures ,  with a reasonable balance of pay- 
ments. In the  upward phase t h e  s t ruc ture  of production changes fas t ,  while t he  
s t ruc tu re  of consumption starts to change only a f t e r  a delay. Because of growing 
vested interests,  t h e  changes in t he  s t ruc ture  of production slow down, just when 
changes in o the r  countries,  especially, demand a f a s t e r  p rocess  of change occurs. 
The increasing mismatch between the  actual and the  required s t ruc tu re  of produc- 
tion causes rigidity on many different levels and markets. This rigidity character-  
izes t he  recession phase,  while t h e  depression phase shows t h e  painful, slow pro- 
cess of adjustment of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of production t o  t he  new circumstances. 
In considering again t he  questions posed in t h e  Introduction as to the  strong- 
ness  and durability of economic recovery,  I am inclined to say tha t  t he  industrial- 
ized world has  not yet  reached  the  lower turning point of t h e  long wave. In my 
opinion, t he  necessary adjustments of t he  production s t ruc tu re  are not yet all exe- 
cuted totally; while t he  rigidity on the  various levels - in t he  form of protection- 
ism, resistance t o  change, gloomy forecasts  - still exists. Of course,  t he  f i r s t  
s t eps  have been taken, but  end i s  not yet reached. 
This sounds negative, and i t  is in a cer ta in  way. It  means t ha t  more painful 
operations have to be  done. However, i t  gives us also t h e  possibility to think a bit  
more about t he  desired economic development. Do w e  want a situation of economic 
growth comparable with t h e  post World War I1 experience, or is  t h e r e  a preference 
f o r  slower growth? 
What the  advantages are of a recovery with a s t rong economic growth do not 
need explanation. Most people/countries have a st rong preference  f o r  a higher 
income, to be  able  t o  fulfill more consumer wants. (Whether th i s  makes people 
more happy is another  question!). This preference for growth has  been a common 
charac te r i s t ic  of t h e  economic behavior of t h e  industrialized countries. 
The disadvantages of such a growth option are also clear. On t h e  whole t he  
consequences f o r  the  environment, f o r  t he  quality of labor ,  f o r  t h e  reasonable use 
of raw materials supplies, and f o r  t h e  Third World Countries have t o  be  considered 
as being much less positive. More and more people have become convinced of 
these  negative consequences. Also, the process of adjustment t ha t  must occur  
gives a negative impact on t h e  pro-growth option. 
But is it then possible to change t o  a low growth option? At f i r s t  sight,  this 
looks a r a the r  promising option, especially fo r  the  environment, labor quality, and 
the  use of r a w  materials supplies. For t h e  Third World Countries the  answer is al- 
ready ambivalent. But t he  main question remains: Is this option a reasonable one 
f o r  industrialized countries? 
Two answers are possible. The answer is no if the choice also implies the  ab- 
sence of fu r the r  s t ructural  changes. If tha t  occurs, the  situation will de te r iora te  
r a t h e r  fast, assuming tha t  not all  the countries will choose for this option and tha t  
consumers retain,  in the  f i r s t  instance, t he  freedom t o  choose. Of course,  restr ic-  
tions in this area are possible, but they a r e  not seen as a viable solution. 
The answer is maybe yes if a continuation of s t ructural  change i s  accepted. In 
this case,  such adjustments could be  made tha t  make a low-growth solution possible 
without restricting too much the  freedom of consumption and tha t  of international 
t rade .  I have written "maybe" because I do not have clear  ideas as t o  what kind of 
adjustments are needed or as to t he  economic viability of this option. The doubt is 
a lso suggested because of a social reason, namely whether a n  industrialized, 
developed country, in which growth has been the major social value f o r  centuries,  
can s t r ive f o r  a low-growth option without creating severe social tensions. This is 
maybe the most important argument t ha t  could prevent such an  option. The possible 
social consequences of t he  downward phase of a long wave, mentioned at t he  end of 
t h e  last  section, make my expectations not really optimistic. 
To find suitable solutions t o  t he  problems sketched and the  questions posed, 
taking into account the  multidisciplinary and international cha rac t e r  of t he  long 
wave phenomenon, more research  i s  needed. Institutions like IIASA could play a 
central  role  in this. Will this challenge be accepted? 
NOTES 
1. A s  an aside, sometimes t h e  striking negative correlation between the  
long-wave development of the  economy and the  number of publications on 
this  topic is noted. If this  correlation is significant, than the  economy 
has not reached i ts  downturn yet,  according to the still growing number 
of publications. 
2. See  Van Paridon (1979 a ,b ,  1982, and 1984). 
3. See  Freeman (1982), Freeman et at. (1982), van Duijn (1983), and Del- 
beke (1981, 1984). 
4. Delbeke made this survey on the basis of the  proceedings of the  
Siena/Florence meeting on long waves, held in October 1983. Most of the 
exper t s  on long waves participated in this conference. The material w a s  
published in Bianchi (1983 and 1985). Delbeke's paper  w a s  included in 
the  proceedings (see Bianchi a.o., 1985). but w a s  also published indepen- 
dently (Delbeke, 1984). 
5. This opinion is based on o u r  own research  (Van Paridon, 1979 a,b),  but 
especially on Bieshaar and Kleinknecht (1984), Van Duijn (1983). and 
Metz (1984). 
6. The following description of the  several theoretical approaches on the 
explanation of the  long wave is strongly dependent on Delbeke (1981, 
1984). 
7. For a closer description of the  several  theories,  see  Delbeke (1981). To 
give an  indication, au thors  are he re  mentioned according t o  t he  main 
determinant in the i r  approach: 
Capital: Fo r r e s t e r  (SDNM), Mandel, Van Dui jn 
Labor: Freeman (SPRU) 
Raw materials: Rostow 
Entrepreneurship/innovation: Mensch, Van Duijn 
8. See Delbeke (1984). Exceptions a r e  Senge (SDNM) and Delbeke and 
Schokkaert .  
9. See Delbeke (1984), with Perez-Perez, Gordon, Edwards and Reich, and 
Glissmann and Wolter, as the main representat ives .  
10. Delbeke, (1984). p. 6. 
11. See Freeman (1982). 
12. See the  a r t i c l e  of Mensch in Bianchi et al. (1983). 
13. See the  a r t i c l e  by Fo r r e s t e r  et al. in Bianchi et a l .  (1983), and Sterman 
(1984). 
14. Whether a country can always r e a p  these  f ru i t s  i s  another  question, as i s  
whether d i r ec t  investment by these companies can be  judged as a profit- 
able development f o r  a country. 
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